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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”) ushered in
a new era in groundwater management in California. In signing SGMA into law,
then-Governor Edmund J. Brown wrote of the State’s “recognition that
groundwater management in California is best accomplished locally. Local
agencies will now have the power to assess the conditions of their local
groundwater basins and take the necessary steps to bring those basins in a state of
chronic long-term overdraft into balance.” 1 Like the parent who cautions warring
children to “sort it out . . . don’t make me come in there,” SGMA offers local
entities a choice: tackle the problem of sustainability within your basin or face
the unsavory prospect of State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”)
intervention.
For better or worse, the state’s critically overdrafted basins will be the
proving ground in which the tensions between SGMA’s admonition to
sustainability and parallel bar on the alteration of water rights plays out. This
Article evaluates the current status of SGMA compliance in these critically
* Partner, Downey Brand LLP; B.A. University of California, Davis; J.D. University of Notre Dame.
The author thanks her colleagues in the Downey Brand water and natural resources group for their constant
collaboration and intellectual curiosity. They deserve ample credit for any wisdom expressed here, and bear no
blame for any errors, omissions, or oversights. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. Signing message from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Members of the California
Legislature (Sept. 16, 2014) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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overdrafted basins and key questions yet to be answered in the next phase of
SGMA implementation.
II. HISTORIC EFFORTS AT GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT
In an average year, groundwater provides approximately 40% of California’s
total water supply, with annual extractions estimated at sixteen million acre-feet. 2
Despite that fact, for most of California’s history groundwater was minimally
regulated, and disputes over its use and the extent of an individual right were
settled in court. 3 To date, there exists no single database in which claims to
groundwater might be documented, evaluated, or quantified. There is likewise
“no statewide system for allocating rights in groundwater.” 4 Instead, the
allocation and policing of groundwater rights has been left to local government or
adjudication by the courts. 5
Broadly speaking, rights to groundwater are classified as overlying,
appropriative, or prescriptive. 6 The overlying right is a correlative right
associated with the ownership of land and determined by evaluating overlying
rights holders’ present and prospective reasonable beneficial use upon the land.7
As a general rule, overlying landowners each enjoy a correlative right to share in
a portion of the groundwater basin’s safe yield, which is defined as the maximum
amount of water that may be extracted from a basin without causing an
undesirable result. 8 That right does not extend to extractions beyond the basin’s
safe yield, however. 9 On the other hand, appropriative rights are not tied to land
ownership and depend upon the affirmative taking of water. 10 As between each
2. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2018, at 2–3 (2019).
3. Ruth Langridge & Christopher Ansell, Comparative Analysis of Institutions to Govern the
Groundwater Commons in California, 11 WATER ALTERNATIVES 481, 484 (2018). For a detailed retrospective
of pre-SGMA groundwater adjudications, see WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
4. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 211 Cal. App. 4th 266, 278 (2012).
5. O.W.L. Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 168 Cal. App. 4th 568, 587–88 (2008); Langridge & Ansell,
supra note 3, at 509–10.
6. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P.
766, 772 (Cal. 1903). California has long embraced a legal fiction dividing surface and groundwater. These
three categories of right belie a much more complicated water rights legal scheme, the extent of which is
beyond the scope of this article. For a thoughtful discussion of the competing water rights considerations at play
when implementing SGMA, see Eric Garner et al., The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the
Common Law of Groundwater Rights – Finding a Consistent Path Forward for Groundwater Allocation, 38
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 163, 174 (2020).
7. City of Santa Maria, 211 Cal. App. 4th 266.
8. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 929 (1949).
9. Id. at 928–29, 931–32 (recognizing an injury that consisted “of the continual lowering of the level and
gradual reducing of the total amount of stored water, the accumulated effect of which, after a period of years,
would be to render the supply insufficient to meet the needs of the rightful owners.” That action “necessarily
interfered with the future possibility of pumping by each of the other parties by lowering the water level.”).
10. City of Santa Maria, 211 Cal. App. 4th at 279.
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other, the rights of each of these landowners are correlative: each “may use only
his reasonable share when water is insufficient to meet the needs of all.”11
Appropriators, in contrast, operate under a first-in-time, first-in-right priority
system in the event of insufficient supply. 12 Finally, an appropriation might ripen
into a prescriptive right when an appropriator continues pumping during times of
overdraft. “An appropriative taking of water which is not surplus is wrongful and
may ripen into a prescriptive right where the use is actual, open and notorious,
hostile and adverse to the original owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the
statutory period of five years, and under claim of right.” 13 Overlying users of
native groundwater retain priority over prescriptive users, but lose amounts not
pumped.14
Where demand outstrips supply, these competing rights holders must be
organized in some sort of priority. Although an appropriator is entitled to take
groundwater that the overlying landowner does not need, the appropriator is
limited to the remainder of the “safe yield” of the basin. 15 Accordingly, when the
safe yield “is insufficient to satisfy the reasonable and beneficial needs of all
users, those with overlying rights take precedence.” 16 In the same vein,
Any water not needed for the reasonable beneficial use of those having
prior rights is excess or surplus water and may rightly be appropriated on
privately owned land for non-overlying use, such as devotion to public
use or exportation beyond the basin or watershed. When there is a
surplus, the holder of prior rights may not enjoin its appropriation. 17
Whether above ground or below, water in California is not privately owned.
Consistent with this principle, water rights holders “have the right to ‘take and
use water,’ but they do not own the water and cannot waste it.” 18 Article X, § 2
of the California Constitution lays out this key animating principle:
[T]he General welfare requires that the water resources of the State be
put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of
water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be
11. Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc. (California Water Service), 224 Cal. App.
2d 715, 725 (1964).
12. Id. at 726.
13. Id. at 725–26.
14. Hi-Desert Cty. Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723, 1730–31 (1994).
15. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 214 (1975).
16. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 211 Cal. App. 4th 266, 279 (2016).
17. California Water Service, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 725.
18. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2021); Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal.
Water Co., 109 Cal. App. 4th 891, 905 (2003); State of California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019,
1023, 1025 (2000) (“[A]t least since 1928 when the predecessor to article X section 2 of the California
Constitution was adopted, there [has been] no private ownership of groundwater.”).
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exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the
interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to
the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in
this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and
shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method
of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. 19
As to groundwater, “[p]ublic interest requires that there be the greatest
number of beneficial users which the supply can yield, and water may be
appropriated for beneficial use subject to the rights of those who have a lawful
priority.” 20
III. ALONG CAME SGMA
It was against this backdrop that SGMA was enacted in 2014. The 2014
California Water Action Plan laid the groundwork, setting out the Governor’s
intent to:
[W]ork with the Legislature to ensure that local and regional agencies
have the incentives, tools, authority and guidance to develop and enforce
local and regional management plans that protect groundwater
elevations, quality, and surface water-groundwater interactions . . . to
define local and regional responsibilities and to give local and regional
agencies the authority to manage groundwater sustainably. 21
That publication goes on to caution that “when a basin is at risk of permanent
damage, and local and regional entities have not made sufficient progress to
correct the problem, the state should protect the basin and its users until an
adequate local program is in place.” 22
Indeed, the Legislature was explicit in its intention to empower local
agencies to bring relief to the State’s struggling basins, while respecting

19. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (emphasis added); see CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2021); City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000) (right extends “to reasonable and beneficial
uses” of the water.); WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 11 (1956) (“The policy
inherent in State water law is to utilize all water available. . .and to require the greatest number of beneficial
uses that the water supply can yield. The limited quantity of water available necessitates careful economy in its
use.”).
20. California Water Service, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 725.
21.
STATE
OF
CAL.,
CALIFORNIA
WATER
ACTION
PLAN
14
(2014),
https://resources.ca.gov/CNRALegacyFiles/docs/california_water_action_plan/2014_California_Water_Action_
Plan.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. Id.
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California’s long-held system of water rights and priorities. 23 In bill analyses on
the Senate floor, staff noted that “[w]hile California uses more groundwater than
any other state, it is the last in the Union to lack an enforceable set of statewide
groundwater management standards.”24 On the Assembly Floor, Representative
Roger Dickinson urged support, noting that the bill was crafted over nine months
with extensive input from stakeholders: “This bill is built on local control . . . It is
an opportunity for local entities to decide how to approach and devise a plan to
get to groundwater sustainability.” The consequences of inaction had to be
addressed: “What are the consequences if we fail to act . . . If not now, then
when? If not us, then who?”
Six years later, the first round of Groundwater Sustainability Plans (“GSPs”)
were submitted to the California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) for
review, and SGMA’s lofty goals were met with the practical challenge of
implementation.
A. Local Action, with a State Backstop
SGMA applies to all groundwater basins and subbasins described in DWR’s
California’s Groundwater: Bulletin 118. 25 DWR is tasked with prioritizing each
of these basins along a continuum from very low- to high-priority, and with
identifying those basins that are subject to critical conditions of overdraft. 26
Although all basins are “encourage[d] and authorize[d]” to develop groundwater
sustainability plans under SGMA, the law’s requirements are mandatory for
those basins designated as medium- or high-priority by DWR. 27 In its 2019 Basin
Prioritization process, ninety-four state basins were designated by DWR as
medium- or high-priority. An additional twenty-one of basins were designated as
critically overdrafted. 28

23. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1 (West 2021); see also SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal.
2014) and AB 1739, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (uncodified findings and declarations) (observing
that “failure to manage groundwater to prevent long-term overdraft infringes on groundwater rights;” that
groundwater is “most effectively managed at the local or regional level,” and that those local entities “need to
have the necessary support and authority to manage groundwater sustainably.”).
24. Senate Rules Committee, Committee Analysis of SB 1168 (Aug. 29, 2014).
25. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(b) (West 2021) (defining “basin” as a basin or sub-basin designated in
Bulletin No. 118.). First published in 1975, Bulletin 118 is a descriptive document cataloging California’s
groundwater resources by basin; it took on new regulatory significance with SGMA’s passage.
26. CAL. WATER CODE § 10722.4 (West 2021).
27. The State’s adjudicated basins are generally exempt from SGMA’s requirements. CAL. WATER CODE
§ 10720.8 (West 2021). In addition, basins that are operated under a DWR-approved alternative to a GSP are
deemed to have met this initial plan preparation requirement. CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.6 (West 2021).
28. DWR’s internal guidance offers that “[a] basin is subject to critical overdraft when continuation of
present water management practices would probably result in significant adverse overdraft-related
environmental, social, or economic impacts.” For an overview of the basin prioritization process, as well as
maps and supporting information, see Basin Prioritization, CAL. DEP’T WATER RESOURCES,
https://water.ca.gov/Programs/Groundwater-Management/Basin-Prioritization (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).

553

2021 / Early Efforts at Defining Sustainability in California’s Critically
Overdrafted Basins
Once they are prioritized, SGMA sets out a timeline within which basins
must meet certain benchmarks along the path to sustainable management. Failing
to do so puts the basin at risk of being designated as probationary and subject to
state intervention by the SWRCB. The first of these benchmarks (i.e., inclusion
within one or more coordinated Groundwater Sustainability Agencies, or
“GSAs”) occurred on June 30, 2017, and passed by largely without incident.29
The second benchmark (i.e., submission of GSPs for basins designated as
critically overdrafted) rolled out in January 2020, and the submitted plans are
currently under review by DWR. 30 By January 2022, the last of the state’s
remaining regulated basins are to be operated under a GSP.31
A GSP is the lynchpin of an agency’s sustainability efforts within a basin.
Each GSP must set out sustainability goals for a basin, culminating in the
absence of undesirable results in the basin within twenty years of the plan’s
implementation, and the managing GSAs must report regularly back to DWR
with their progress toward attaining that goal. 32 SGMA and the regulations
promulgated under it provide extensive guidance about what a GSP must include,
all of which is oriented around the “sustainability goal” that the GSA, through a
GSP, has established for the basin. A GSP must define the sustainability goal for
the basin and explain the actions that will be taken to achieve that goal within
twenty years of the plan’s implementation. 33
Submission of the GSP is not the finish line for these basins: GSPs are then
evaluated by DWR to determine whether the plan “conforms with [Water Code]
Sections 10727.2 and 10727.4 and is likely to achieve the sustainability goal for
the basin.” 34 GSPs are evaluated by DWR based on a substantial compliance
standard, provided that the sustainability goals of SGMA are satisfied. 35 DWR
will consider whether the interests of the beneficial uses and users of
groundwater have been adequately considered, the feasibility of the actions
contemplated by the GSP, and the GSA’s legal and financial ability to implement

29. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 2.
30. CAL. WATER CODE § 10735.2(a) (West 2021).
31. WATER § 10735.2(a)(4).
32. CAL. WATER CODE § 10733(a) (West 2021). Plan development and review is governed in part by
DWR’s SGMA implementing regulations, which were adopted in 2016 and codified in Title 23, Division 2,
Chapter 1.5 of the California Code of Regulations. The regulations “identify the necessary plan components
specified in [SGMA] and other information that will assist local agencies in developing and implementing
groundwater sustainability plans and coordination agreements.” They also “identify appropriate methodologies
and assumptions for baseline conditions concerning hydrology, water demand, regulatory restrictions that affect
the availability of surface water, and unreliability of, or reductions in, surface water deliveries to the agency or
water users in the basin, and the impact of those conditions on achieving sustainability. The baseline for
measuring unreliability and reductions shall include the historic average reliability and deliveries of surface
water to the agency or water users in the basin.” CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.2(b)(2) (West 2021).
33. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.24 (2016); see CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b) (West 2021).
34. WATER § 10733(a); see CAL. WATER CODE § 10733.4(a) (West 2021).
35. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 350.4(c) (2021).
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the GSP, among other factors. After their initial adoption, plans will be reviewed
by DWR at no less than five-year intervals, and whenever amended, to determine
the plan’s continued compliance with SGMA and the regulations.
To be designated as “adequate,” a GSP must be submitted within the
appropriate statutory timeframe, include all of the information required by
SGMA and the regulations (including a coordination agreement, as necessary),
cover the entire basin, and have any deficiencies addressed by DWR in its review
addressed and remedied within the appropriate timeframe. 36 “The assessment
may include recommended corrective actions to address any deficiencies
identified by the department.” 37 If a GSP is deemed inadequate, or if sufficient
progress toward sustainability is not maintained, the basin may be at risk for
State intervention. 38
As of this Article’s publication, forty-seven GSPs, representing twenty-two
separate groundwater basins, have been submitted to DWR for assessment. 39
DWR must evaluate these plans and issue an assessment within two years of their
submittal. For most critically overdrafted basins, then, this assessment is due in
January 2022.
B. The GSP as a Scaffolding for Sustainability Determinations
DWR’s evaluation of the GSP considers, among other criteria, whether the
plan is “likely to achieve the sustainability goals for the basin.” 40 But SGMA
does not offer any numeric prescription for the amount of water that may be
extracted from each basin, or the precise way that sustainability must defined in a
given basin. Instead, it sets a scaffolding upon which the managing GSAs can
construct their plans, leaving the most crucial substantive decisions (e.g., the
specific parameters that constitute an undesirable result) to the decision-making
authority of the local entity.
Development of these plans is a comprehensive and data-intensive endeavor.
Together, SGMA and its implementing regulations direct that the GSP shall
include the following key elements:

36. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 355.4 (2021).
37. WATER § 10733.4(d).
38. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10727.2, 10727.4 (West 2021); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 355.2 (2021).
39.
Submitted
plans
may
be
found
on
DWR’s
SGMA
portal,
located
at
https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/all. Of the submitted plans, all but 4 (the Castac Lake Valley (5-029); the
Sacramento Valley North and South Yuba Subbasins (5-021.60 & 5-021.61); the Las Posas Valley (4-008)) are
from basins designated as critically overdrafted. Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., SGMA Portal, CA.GOV,
https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/ (last visited Mat 7, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
40. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 355.4.
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•
•
•
•
•

A water budget and quantified sustainable yield for the basin.41
A description of the physical setting and characteristics of the aquifer
system underlying the basin. 42
Quantifiable, numeric minimum thresholds for each of six
sustainability indicators, the presence of which indicates an
undesirable result in the basin. 43
Monitoring protocols for relevant sustainability indicators, designed
to detect changes in groundwater levels, groundwater quality, and
subsidence (among other factors). 44
One or more measurable objectives for each sustainability indicator,
together with five-year interim milestones to measure progress
toward the objective. 45

The plans are oriented around the identification, evaluation, and response to
six sustainability indicators (SGMA’s “six deadly sins”) that the GSP must
evaluate in determining the presence or absence of undesirable results in a basin.
These include: (1) chronic lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant
and unreasonable depletion of supply if continued over the fifty-year planning
and implementation horizon; 46 (2) reduction of groundwater storage; (3) seawater
intrusion; (4) degraded water quality, including the migration of contaminant
plumes that impair water supplies; (5) land subsidence that substantially
interferes with surface land uses; and (6) depletions of interconnected surface
water that have significant and unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses
of the surface water. 47
In addition to minimum thresholds for each of these indicators, the plan must
describe the cause of the groundwater conditions that lead to the undesirable
result; the criteria, “based on a quantitative description of the combination of

41. WATER § 10727.2.
42. Id.
43. The agency may establish criteria and objectives that are specific to unique “management areas”
within a basin, and may apply different criteria and establish different definitions of the groundwater conditions
giving rise to undesirable effects in those areas, provided that the interests of beneficial uses and users of
groundwater have been adequately considered and the GSA demonstrates that the use of different criteria in
management areas does not adversely affect its ability to achieve the sustainability goal for the basin. CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 351(r), 354.20, 354.26(b) (2021).
44. WATER § 10727.2.
45. WATER § 10727.2(b)(1); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.30 (2021). Measurable objectives must be
measured along the same values and monitoring sites as minimum thresholds under which undesirable effects
are identified, and must be sufficiently above the undesirable effects threshold so as to “provide a reasonable
margin of operational flexibility under adverse conditions.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.30(b).
46. Overdraft during a drought is specifically exempted from this definition, provided that groundwater
levels are managed appropriately during other periods. CAL. WATER CODE § 10735(a) (West 2021).
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(x) (West 2021).
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minimum threshold exceedances that cause significant and unreasonable effects
in the basin”; and the potential effects on the beneficial uses and users of
groundwater that may occur from the specified undesirable result. 48 SGMA’s
implementing regulations recognize that a GSA may need to evaluate multiple
thresholds, across multiple basin monitoring sites, to determine whether an
undesirable result is occurring. 49
C. Bringing Teeth to Sustainable Management
Finally, SGMA empowers GSAs to take action to bring wayward portions of
their basins into compliance with the sustainability mandate. To that end, GSPs
must contain descriptions of the projects and management actions adopted to
meet measurable objectives and prevent undesirable results, as well as
contingency projects or actions that will be implemented in the event that
groundwater conditions do not adequately respond to measures provided in the
GSP or certain measures become infeasible, and criteria for triggering those
actions. 50 For example, where pumping exceeds the sustainable yield of the
basin, GSAs will need to look to supply augmentation projects, reductions in
pumping, or a combination of these strategies to bring the basin back into
balance.
To achieve SGMA’s sustainability mandate, GSAs are endowed with
considerable enforcement authority. Those powers are overlaid onto the existing
authorities of the GSA—each of which is a public agency or combination of
public agencies with water planning responsibilities within their basins. 51 Of
particular note in overdrafted basins, GSAs have explicit authority to control the
method, frequency, and volume of groundwater extraction. 52 This includes the
authority to:
Regulate, limit, or suspend extractions from individual wells or from
groundwater wells in the aggregate and to require extractors to operate on a
rotation basis. 53
Regulate new well construction, enlargement of existing wells, or
reactivation of abandoned wells.
48. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.26(b) (2021).
49. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.26(c).
50. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.44 (2021).
51. Note that however broad these authorities may be, GSAs cannot supersede local land use planning:
CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.8(f) (West 2021) (“Nothing in this chapter or a groundwater sustainability plan
shall be interpreted as superseding the land use authority of cities and counties, including the city or county
general plan, within the overlying basin.”). At this early stage of implementation, it is not clear how a conflict
between GSPs and county ordinances addressing groundwater issues, well construction standards, et cetera
would be resolved.
52. Most of a GSA’s powers, with the exception of some limited fee functions, are keyed to the GSA’s
submission of a groundwater sustainability plan (GSP) to DWR. Practically speaking, this means that the terms
of the GSP will in most cases define the way in which the GSA exercises these authorities.
53. CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.4(a)(2) (West 2021).
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Establish groundwater allocations and associated accounting rules and
“authorize temporary and permanent transfers of groundwater extraction
allocations within the agency’s boundaries.” 54
Levy both fixed and volumetric fees, “including, but not limited to, fees that
increase based on the quantity of groundwater produced annually, the year in
which the production of groundwater commenced from a groundwater extraction
facility, and impacts to the basin.” 55
GSAs also enjoy the authority to adopt rules, regulations, ordinances, and
resolutions; 56 acquire and sell real property, including water rights; 57 require
registration, reporting, and metering of groundwater extraction facilities within
the GSA’s management area; 58 and perform “any act necessary or proper to carry
out the purposes of” SGMA. 59 GSAs may impose—either administratively or
through the filing of an action in the superior court—civil penalties on persons
who: (1) extract groundwater in excess of the amount authorized under a rule,
regulation, ordinance, or resolution; or (2) violate any rule, regulation, ordinance,
or resolution adopted by the GSA to carry out SGMA.60 These powers are a
supplement to the existing authority already exercised by the agency serving as a
GSA. 61
Section 10720.5 limits these broad authorities, providing in relevant part that
groundwater management pursuant to SGMA “shall be consistent with Section 2
of Article X of the California Constitution.” 62 Under that section, the rule of
54. Id. at (a)(2)–(4).
55. CAL. WATER CODE § 10730.2(d) (West 2021).
56. CAL. WATER CODE § 10725.2(b) (West 2021).
57. CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2 (West 2021). This includes the specific authority to “appropriate and
acquire surface water or groundwater and surface water or groundwater rights, import surface water or
groundwater into the agency, and conserve and store within or outside the agency that water . . .” WATER §
10726.2(b); and to “purchase, transfer, deliver, or exchange water or water rights of any type with any person
. . .” WATER § 10726.2(d).
58. CAL. WATER CODE § 10725.6 (West 2021); CAL. WATER CODE § 10725.8(a), (c), (e) (West 2021).
59. WATER § 10725.2(a).
60. CAL. CAL. WATER CODE § 10732(a)–(b) (West 2021). For extractions of groundwater above
authorized amounts, the penalty may not exceed $500 per acre-foot extracted in excess of the amount
authorized. WATER § 10732(a)(1). For violations of any rule, regulation, ordinance, or resolution adopted by the
GSA to carry out the Act, the penalty may not exceed $1000, plus $100 for each additional day on which the
violation continues if the person fails to comply within 30 days after notice of the violation. WATER §
10732(a)(2). Penalties imposed under Section 10732 are to be paid to the GSA and may be expended by the
GSA solely for purposes of the Act, and in general cannot be imposed on de minimis extractors. WATER §§
10732(c); 10730(a).
61. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 10725 (West 2021) (“A groundwater sustainability agency may
exercise any of the powers described in this chapter in implementing this part, in addition to, and not as a
limitation on, any existing authority.”) (emphasis added); CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.8(a) (West 2021) (“This
part is in addition to, and not a limitation on, the authority granted to a local agency under any other law.”)
(emphasis added).
62. WATER § 10725; CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1(b) (Legislative intent in SGMA is “[t]o enhance
local management of groundwater consistent with rights to use or store groundwater and Section 2 of Article X
of the California Constitution. It is the intent of the Legislature to preserve the security of water rights in the
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reasonable use applies to all water rights enjoyed or asserted in the state, whether
these rights are grounded on the riparian right or the right, analogous to the
riparian right, of the overlying land owner, or the percolating water right, or the
appropriative right. 63 Article X, § 2 further provides that it shall not be
interpreted “[a]s depriving any appropriator of water to which the appropriator is
lawfully entitled.” Likewise, nothing in SGMA, or “in any groundwater
management plan adopted pursuant to [SGMA], determines or alters surface
water rights or groundwater rights under common law or any provision of law
that determines or grants surface water rights.” 64
While the principle of preserving water rights is sound, its application in the
face of imperfect information, disproportionate demand for water, and local
disputes about the timing and extent of rights is practically challenging. When it
comes to limits on extraction, caselaw offers some general principles but little
meaningful refuge. Less than seventy published cases make specific findings
about the priorities of rights in an overdrafted (or potentially overdrafted) basin,
and in each the court cautions that the determination and appropriate solution is a
basic-specific one. 65 In contrast, a Westlaw search for published cases relating to
the appropriation of surface water (one category of many in the surface water
management legal regime) turns up more than 5,700 published cases.
IV. EARLY EFFORTS IN DEFINING SUSTAINABILITY UNDER SGMA
The state’s critically overdrafted basins provide the first public test of
SGMA’s organizational structure. Groundwater management in California has
long been limited by the concept of a “safe yield” for the basin. SGMA, however,
differs in that it asks GSAs to act preemptively in setting thresholds beyond
which conditions may not degrade. In an optimistic view, this approach affords
all basin stakeholders an opportunity to identify and plan for the specific change
in conditions that would indicate a condition of overdraft, without first resorting
to expensive litigation. In a more pessimistic one, it places the burden of setting
those parameters (and the attendant risk of litigation) squarely on the GSAs,
many of whom face data and funding gaps that complicate their ability to arrive
state to the greatest extent possible consistent with the sustainable management of groundwater.”); see also SB
1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (uncodified findings) (“It is, therefore, the intent of the
Legislature to . . . respect overlying and other proprietary rights to groundwater, consistent with Section 1200 of
the Water Code.”). A limited exception exists in basins designated as medium- or high-priority, in that
extractions during the period between SGMA’s effective date and a plan’s adoption and approval in the basin
may not be used as evidence to establish or defend against a claim of prescription. CAL. WATER CODE §
10720.5(a) (West 2021).
63. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000) (referring to Cal. Const. art.
X, § 2).
64. WATER § 10720.5(b) (emphasis added).
65. See also Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 724 (1964)
(“The question of who shall bear the burden of curtailing the overdraft, and in what proportion, depends upon
the legal nature and status of the particular water right held by each party.”).
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at final parameters. 66
On June 3, DWR issued the first results of its review of the critically
overdrafted basins. Two (the Santa Cruz Mid-County GSP and the 180/400 Foot
Aquifer GSP) were approved, another two (the Paso Robles Area GSP and
Cuyama Valley GSP) were issued initial consultation letters seeking further
dialogue between their respective GSAs and DWR regarding possible areas of
GSP deficiency. The remaining plans remain under review as of the date of this
Article’s publication. Given that timeline, medium- and high-priority basins may
take some lessons from the current round of submittals but should expect that the
final review of the initial critically overdrafted GSPs will be released at too late a
date to make meaningful responsive changes prior to their January 2022
submission deadlines. Still, a few themes stand out in this initial round.
A. Broadly Defined Sustainability Goals
By law, each GSP is oriented toward the pursuit and attainment of a basinspecific “sustainability goal.” SGMA defines a sustainability goal, rather
amorphously, as “the existence and implementation of one or more groundwater
sustainability plans that achieve sustainable groundwater management by
identifying and causing the implementation of measures targeted to ensure that
the applicable basin is operated within its sustainable yield.” 67 In turn,
sustainable yield is the maximum quantity of water, calculated over a base period
representative of long-term conditions in the basin, including any temporary
surplus, that can be withdrawn annually from a groundwater supply without
causing an undesirable result. 68
A GSA will demonstrate that it has achieved the sustainability goal by
“demonstrating that the management and use of groundwater in the basin can be
maintained through the [fifty-year] planning and implementation horizon without
causing undesirable results.” 69 However, SGMA does not direct GSAs to return
the basin to its undeveloped status or eliminate historic conditions of overdraft
(though they are certainly free to take steps toward that end). GSAs are entitled
to use 2015 as a baseline and are only required to address those undesirable

66. There have been some efforts to improve upon this data gap. For example, the Open and Transparent
Water Data Act is intended to “seize upon” the opportunity provided by improvements in technology and opensource platforms “to integrate and increase access to existing water data.” CAL. CAL. WATER CODE § 12401(b)
(West 2021). The centerpiece of AB 1755 is a statewide integrated data platform through which DWR, SWRCB
and CDFW are directed to “coordinate and integrate existing water and ecological data.” CAL. WATER CODE §§
12405, 12410 (West 2021). The purpose of that integration includes, but is not limited to, “providing adequate
information to implement [SGMA], improving the management of the state’s water resources, and bringing
greater transparency to water transfers and the market.” WATER § 12405.
67. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(u) (West 2021).
68. WATER § 10721(w).
69. WATER § 10721(r); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.24 (2021).
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results that occurred after SGMA’s effective date. 70
A real-time example is illustrative. The East Kaweah GSP defines its
sustainability goal as follows:
The Kaweah Subbasin’s sustainability goal is for each GSA to manage
groundwater resources to preserve the viability of existing agricultural
enterprises of the region, domestic wells, and smaller communities that
provide much of their job base in the Subbasin, including the school
districts serving these communities. The goal will also strive to fulfill the
water needs of existing and amended county and city general plans that
commit to continued economic and population growth within Tulare
County and portions of Kings County. 71
The GSP then identifies a specific sustainable yield for the basin (between
660,000 and 720,000 acre-feet) and a series of projects and management actions
that will be implemented to meet the sustainability goal within twenty years of
the plan’s implementation. These actions will continue the GSP’s sustainable
management through the fifty-year planning and implementation horizon
identified by SGMA.72
B. Sustainable Yield (. . . For Now)
SGMA defines sustainable yield as “the maximum quantity of water,
calculated over a base period representative of long-term conditions in the basin
and including any temporary surplus, that can be withdrawn annually from a
groundwater supply without causing an undesirable result.” 73 Though it is not
synonymous with the common law concept of safe yield, there is some overlap:
within case law, “safe yield” is defined as the maximum quantity of water that
can be withdrawn annually from a groundwater supply under a given set of
conditions without causing an undesirable result. 74 The types of undesirable
results to be considered in computing safe yield under the common law recognize
similar indicia to those called out in SGMA, including depletion of groundwater
supply, dependability of annual replenishment, storage capacity of the
underground reservoir, extent to which the water table may safely be lowered,
whether pumping will gradually lower groundwater levels resulting eventually in
depletion of the supply, and the risk of water quality degradation 75
70. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b)(4) (West 2021).
71. E. KAWEAH GSA, GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, at ES 1.3 (2020).
72. Id.
73. WATER § 10721(w).
74. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 278 (1975) (quoting City of Pasadena
v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 929 (1949)), (disapproved of on other grounds by City of Barstow v.
Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000)).
75. Id.; Allen v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 29 Cal. 2d 466, 475 (1946); see also Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal.
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In high-stakes basins like those first identified as critically overdraft by
DWR, no GSA’s determination of sustainable yield is likely to be unassailable. A
specific charge by the GSA that an individual pumper reduce its draw on the
basin invites litigation; unfortunately, failure to levy such restrictions may do the
same, by inviting the SWRCB to designate the basin as probationary for its
failure to achieve sustainability. At the same time, SGMA also directs that it shall
not alter existing rights or priorities or water and must be interpreted consistent
with Article X, § 2, which requires that “the water resources of the State be put to
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable.” A decision by a
GSA reflecting a more conservative sustainable yield than the analogous standard
for a court’s determination of safe yield risks presents challenges too, as
dissatisfied water right holders jostle for priority position in the face of a limited
supply.
In response to these uncertainties in application, many GSAs have deferred
judgment on individual water rights and extractions, taking great pains to reserve
flexibility for themselves as they gather more data about the basin. The analysis
in the coordinated Kern County GSPs is emblematic of this approach:
The C2VSimFG-Kern estimates of sustainable and native yield presented
here are based on available data and the current level of model
calibration. Therefore, these estimates are considered appropriate as
guides to SGMA planning. However, the C2VSimFG-Kern sustainable
and native yield estimates are initial water budget estimates that are not
intended for determination of individual landowner allocations or
groundwater rights. Additional technical and legal analysis, along with
stakeholder involvement, is necessary to fully quantify the sustainable
and native yields. 76
Still, other GSPs acknowledge the potential for a distinction between basin
safe yield and sustainable yield pursuant to SGMA. In the Kaweah subbasin, the
safe yield “is estimated to be about 720,000 AF, which amount includes net subsurface inflow. As defined in SGMA however, the Subbasin’s sustainable yield
may be additionally impacted when considering undesirable results for other
sustainability indicators.” 77
The coordinated Kaweah Subbasin GSPs also reserve flexibility for the
future: in their 2020 Coordination Agreement, the GSAs stipulated that although
safe yield of the basin might be higher, sustainable yield “may be something less
617 (1909).
76.
KERN COUNTY SUBBASIN COORDINATION AGREEMENT app. 2, at 21 (2020),
https://groundwaterexchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Kern-Coordination-Agreement-withAppendixes-1-2020-Updated.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (emphasis added).
77.
KAWEAH
SUBBASIN
COORDINATION
AGREEMENT,
app.
3
(2020),
https://www.midkaweah.org/documents (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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and have agreed that the total groundwater inflow of 660,000 AF identified in
Table 3.2.” That number “will continue to be revised pursuant to the monitoring
of sustainability indicators and avoidance of undesirable results.” 78
This reserved flexibility is generally consistent with SGMA’s direction that a
GSP should identify and respond to data gaps, updating as necessary. However,
that flexibility may present on-the-ground operational challenges, particularly in
coordination within and between basins when an undesirable result looms, and
the responsible agencies are forced to respond to those conditions with limits on
extractions or by expending funds on projects and management actions.
C. Reductions in Groundwater Levels as a Hallmark of Undesirable Results
The six sustainability criteria overlay many of the indicia of overdraft already
recognized in common law, though without the specificity that SGMA now
demands of its GSPs. 79 However, whereas in the common law the determination
of overdraft was left to the court, SGMA prods GSAs to act preemptively by
requiring that the GSP establish a quantifiable, numeric threshold for each
sustainability criteria, beyond which that particular condition shall be deemed an
undesirable result as a matter of law. 80
Herein lies an important procedural distinction in a GSA’s calculation of
undesirable results and sustainable yield versus a court’s evaluation of whether
the safe yield of a basin has been exceeded, resulting in conditions of overdraft.
For purposes of developing and evaluating the sufficiency of a GSP, the
minimum threshold selected by the GSA “refers to a numeric value for each
sustainability indicator used to define undesirable results,” identified in advance
and tracked and enforced by the GSA.81 Exceeding these thresholds triggers
intervention by the managing GSA, typically characterized as projects or
management actions in the GSP. 82
So for example, California Water Code § 10721(x)(1) identifies “chronic
lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant and unreasonable
depletion of supply if continued over the [fifty-year] planning and

78. Id.
79. See Garner et al., supra note 6, at 174 (“Although the scope of “undesirable results’ is mainly
undefined in case law, the common law principle is at least as broad as SGMA’s definition. Indeed, the specific
undesirable results addressed in an adjudication have historically only been those raised by the pleadings of the
litigants. The courts have not rejected any of the SGMA-specific undesirable results; some simply have not yet
been fully litigated.”).
80. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(x) (West 2021); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 354.22, 354.26, 354.28
(2021). Compare this approach to the common law tradition of naming and responding to overdraft that has
already occurred: see, e.g., City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 211 Cal. App. 4th 266, 278, 291 (2016) (in
determining whether Basin was in overdraft, court looked for “physical manifestations of overdraft and, finding
none (other than some subsidence in the Nipomo area, which the court concluded did not demonstrate Basinwide overdraft), the court was satisfied that the Basin had not been in overdraft . . . .”).
81. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 351(t) (2021) (emphasis added).
82. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.44 (2021).

563

2021 / Early Efforts at Defining Sustainability in California’s Critically
Overdrafted Basins
implementation horizon” as an undesirable result under SGMA. That definition is
similar to the “gradual lowering of the ground water levels resulting eventually in
depletion of the supply” recognized as an undesirable result and indicia of
overdraft in San Fernando.83 But, in basins implementing SGMA, the GSA is
entrusted with the threshold decision of exactly how much depletion of supply
rises to the level of “significant and unreasonable” such that a response is
merited.
But SGMA also allows a GSP to use groundwater elevation as an effective
proxy for other sustainability indicators where the GSA “can demonstrate that the
representative value is a reasonable proxy for multiple individual minimum
thresholds as supported by adequate evidence.” 84 A number of GSPs have
incorporated this approach. So for example, California Water Code § 10721(x)(2)
provides that significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage is an
undesirable result. In the Tulare Lake basin, reductions in groundwater storage
are considered significant and unreasonable when groundwater levels exceed the
minimum threshold in more than 45% of all monitored wells within a
consecutive three-year period. 85 If that threshold is exceeded, the GSAs would
engage in management actions to bring the basin back into sustainability,
including supply augmentation projects, fees for groundwater extraction,
limitation or regulation of groundwater extraction, water banking, and increases
to storage capacity. 86
D. Locally Managed Allocations & Demand Reductions
Even pre-SGMA, a right holder’s extraction was not absolute: whether
appropriative, prescriptive, or overlying, it is tied to the overall safe yield of the
basin and the presence or absence of overdraft. 87 SGMA introduces a new twist:
whether through voluntary action or by exercising their regulatory powers, GSAs
are directed to bring overdrafted basins back into a condition of sustainability,
curbing overdraft to ensure the appropriate balance can be struck for both water
right holders and basin stakeholders. Data from the initial GSP submissions
suggests that the GSAs recognize the near-universal need to engage in some
measure of demand reduction in these basins. At the same time, the GSAs
acknowledge that information about the individual claims of right in the basin is
complicated and often imperfect. California’s Central Valley is heavily
represented in this initial round of submissions, and its challenges in groundwater
83. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 278 (1975).
84. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 354.28(d) (2021).
85. TULARE LAKE SUBBASIN GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, at 4-17, § 4.3.3.2 (2020),
http://www.midkingsrivergsa.org/assets/tulare-lake-subbasin-groundwater-sustainability-plan%2c-january2020.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. Id.
87. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000).
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management are well-documented. In the Madera basin, for example, the GSP
aims for 90,000 annual acre-foot reduction in groundwater extractions as a result
of a Crop Water Use Reduction Program, on top of an additional 15,900 acrefoot reduction as a result of converting presently irrigated lands into recharge
facilities. 88
Following SGMA’s locally focused ethos, the Tulare Lake GSP does not
prescribe responses to a minimum threshold exceedance but rather notes that the
five GSAs responsible for implementing the plan in the basin each “have the
flexibility to choose which types of projects and management actions they would
like to pursue in attaining sustainable management. . . . [D]ecisions regarding
projects and policies will depend on conditions and management of the GSA at
the board level.” 89
That approach is not unusual among the submitted GSPs, and likely to be
appealing to future planners for its ability to lend basin-wide flexibility, and to
imbue local management authorities with a more direct voice in the reduction,
extraction, and spending decisions likely to impact their constituents. See, for
example, the Tule Basin Coordination Agreement, which offers that for purposes
of establishing a water budget, the GSAs “have agreed that the Sustainable Yield
for the Subbasin shall be divided amongst the GSAs. . . . The water budget, as
divided amongst the GSAs, is not an allocation or final determination of any
water rights (including without limitation any claimed appropriative or
prescriptive rights).” 90 Each GSA is then responsible for implementing projects
and management actions within its own area consistent with the overarching
goals of the GSP. 91
V. CONCLUSION
California’s groundwater challenges have evolved over its more than 150year history, and it would be naive to assume they could be solved in the initial
salvo of GSP submissions. For better or worse, some of the greatest challenges
and innovations brought about by SGMA will play out in California’s
agriculture-rich Central Valley, whereby some estimates agricultural water use
exceeds available groundwater supply by two million acre-feet annually, or 11%

88.
MADERA SUBBASIN JOINT GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, at ES-9 (2020),
https://www.maderacountywater.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Madera_GSP_2020_FinalReport.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. TULARE LAKE SUBBASIN GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY PLAN, supra note 85 at 6-12, § 6.3.3.6;
see generally id. ch. 6.
90. TULE SUBBASIN COORDINATION AGREEMENT 47 (2020), https://groundwaterexchange.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/5-022.13-Tule_Coordination-Agreement_Updated.pdf (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
91. Id. at 49 (“Projects and management actions will be implemented by each GSA in order to decelerate
and arrest chronic lowering of local groundwater levels within the Tule Subbasin by 2040.”).
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of total water use for the region. 92 The critically overdrafted basins offer a series
of test cases for this effort and clearly reflect an effort to reserve maximum
flexibility in management while the GSAs scramble to meet SGMA’s
sustainability mandates. Their future success, however, hinges on the GSAs’
ability to answer preemptively the question that to date has always been
retrospective: when imperfect claims of right meet overwhelming demand, where
does the resource get allocated? For many basins, the answer is still murky.

92. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 2, at 2–3 (estimating that between spring 2005 to spring
2010, Central Valley aquifers experienced a net depletion of stored groundwater of approximately 13 million
acre-feet, or approximately 4 times the total storage of Lake Oroville); ELLEN HANAK ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST.
CAL., WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 10 (2019), https://www.ppic.org/wpcontent/uploads/water-and-the-future-of-the-san-joaquin-valley-february-2019.pdf (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (further noting that 11 of the San Joaquin Valley’s fifteen groundwater basins have
been designated by the State as critically overdrafted).
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